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CERTIFYING QUESTIONS TO THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT:
A PRACTICAL MEANS FOR FEDERAL COURTS IN CLARIFYING
ARKANSAS STATE LAW
Coby W. Logan*
"Our principal task, in this... case, is to determine what the New
York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought. "I
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court declared in 1938 that "[t]here is
no federal common law [, that] the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the state[,] [a]nd [that] the law of the state shall be declared by its Legis-
lature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision," ' federal courts have
struggled with the best method to determine how a particular state's highest
court might answer an unresolved question of state law. Until 2002, a feder-
al court attempting to predict how the Arkansas Supreme Court would an-
swer an unresolved question of state law had essentially two options. One
approach, of course, was for a federal court to make an "Erie-educated
* Coby W. Logan is an associate with the law firm of Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C. in
Fort Smith, Arkansas; a former law clerk to the Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States
District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas; and a former judicial extem to the Ho-
norable Tom J. Keith, Arkansas Circuit Court Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit West, Divi-
sion One. The author would like to thank Ms. Joan Owens, Chief Deputy Clerk for the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court, and Ms. Holli North, Deputy Clerk and Records Supervisor for the
Arkansas Supreme Court Clerk's Office, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
Further, the author would like to express his sincere appreciation to the UALR Law Review
Editorial Board for their excellent and invaluable work on this article.
t This is, perhaps, one of the most famous expressions of the difficulties expe-
rienced by a federal court in determining state law which was made by the Honorable Henry
Jacob Friendly sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the
case of Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960). In that diversity
case, the decedent had died in a crash in California on a plane operated by a California Com-
pany. The decedent's widow, who resided in South Carolina, and the administrator of the
estate, who resided in New York, brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. See id. The issue in the case heard by Judge Friendly was
which state's statute of limitations applied, which turned on determining which state's subs-
tantive law applied. See id.
1. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the applicable state).
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guess" based on dicta and "obvious implications and inferences" in Arkan-
sas precedent and any other available sources of Arkansas law that might
help ascertain how the Arkansas Supreme Court might rule.2 Another option
was for a federal court to simply abstain and decline supplemental jurisdic-
tion over cases with novel or complex questions of Arkansas state law while
the federal court waited for the Arkansas Supreme Court to make a determi-
nation on the issue.' In 2002, however, a third option became available to
federal courts when Rule 6-8 of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of
Arkansas was adopted by the Arkansas General Assembly. This new rule
authorized federal courts to certify questions of law directly to the Arkansas
Supreme Court.4 Although many commentators have discussed the certifica-
tion process and there exists an enormous amount of literature written on the
subject,5 the topic has not yet received a notable amount of attention here in
the State of Arkansas.
Although virtually every article written on this topic includes such, this
article would not be complete if there were not included herein a brief histo-
ry of the certification process. It is universally recognized that in 1945, the
Florida Legislature passed the first statute in the nation that authorized the
Florida Supreme Court to adopt rules for receiving certified questions from
federal courts.6 The legal authority was there, but the statute was not utilized
until fifteen years later when the United States Supreme Court, no less, ac-
tually used the statute for the first time.7 Since that time, the use of the certi-
fication process has continued to increase, not the least of which was helped
when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
2. Food Indus. Research & Eng'g Inc. v. Alaska, 507 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1974); Yoder
v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1941).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
4. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(a)(1).
5. See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Transcript of Proceedings of Uniform State Laws,
UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT 3 (Aug. 3, 1966) and (Aug. 1, 1967)
[hereinafter Transcript of 1966 or Transcript of 1967]; CARROL SERON, CERTIFYING
QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1983); William G. Bassler &
Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and Jurisprudential Reasons Why
New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 491 (1998);
Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157 (2003); Brian Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 717 (1969); Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127 (1992); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 326-27 (1977); Geri J. Yo-
nover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REv. 305
(1994); see also JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 1, 117-18 (1995) (providing a bibliography of
certification literature in Appendix B as well as a short synopsis of each referenced article).
6. 1945 Fla. Laws ch. 23098 § 1, codified at FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1995).
7. Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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and the American Bar Association established the first Uniform Certifica-
tion of Questions of Law Act (UCQLA) in 1967, and subsequently the re-
vised 1995 UCQLA.8 Almost every recently written piece of literature on
certification attests that the majority of states now allow federal courts to
certify questions directly to their supreme courts and reiterates the mostly
favorable acceptance of the certification process, as the vast majority of
commentators acknowledge "the nearly unanimous endorsement [of] certifi-
cation... from major American legal institutions, legal scholars, and judges
who have addressed the issue."9
Although the certification process has garnered a great deal of praise
and support, the certification process is not without its critics. An in-depth
discussion of the pros and cons of the certification process, however, is
beyond the scope of this article. Such a discussion would be an exercise in
futility as the Arkansas General Assembly has already adopted Rule 6-8 of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Arkansas, and whether or not it
was a good idea for such a rule to be adopted is not the focus of this Article.
Rather, the purpose of this Article is to raise awareness of the authority of
federal courts to certify questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court and of
some of the undeveloped legal issues surrounding the rule itself.
II. CERTIFICATION TO THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
A. A Brief History of the Certification Process to the Arkansas Supreme
Court
As mentioned above, the certification process is relatively new to the
State of Arkansas. Rule 6-8 of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of
Arkansas was adopted in 2002 pursuant to section 2(D)(3) of Amendment
80 to the Arkansas Constitution, which states the following: "The Supreme
Court shall have ... [o]riginal jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States, which may be exercised pursuant to
Supreme Court rule."' Thus, federal courts may now certify legal questions
directly to the Arkansas Supreme Court for resolution. However, the certifi-
cation process is permissive on both ends as the process requires (1) permis-
sion, a motion, and certification order from a federal court and (2) accep-
tance of the question by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Such permission and
acceptance is a matter of judicial discretion with each of the judicial bodies
respectively.
8. See generally UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW (ACT) (RULE) 1995, 12
UCQLA 74 (1996); Cochran, supra note 5, at 167; Robbins, supra note 5, at 128.
9. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 5, at 496-504; see also Cochran, supra note 5, at 159.
10. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 2(D)(3).
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At the time of the writing of this Article, the Arkansas Supreme Court
has accepted only four petitions for certification since the Arkansas General
Assembly promulgated Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 in 2002." Addi-
tionally, there have been at least a few cases where federal courts declined to
certify questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 
2
B. Analysis of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8
1. Power to Answer
Section (a) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled "Power to
Answer," is the most complicated and important section, setting forth the
rule's substance. The remaining sections, with the exception of Section (h),
simply detail the procedures for invoking and implementing Section (a).
Section (a)(1) provides:
The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, answer questions of law certi-
fied to it by order of a federal court of the United States if there are in-
volved in any proceeding before it questions of Arkansas law which may
be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as
to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling
precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.' 3
11. Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, 352 Ark. 207, 99 S.W.3d 427 (2003); Shipley, Inc.
v. Long, 356 Ark. 220, 148 S.W.3d 746 (2004) ("Shipley I"); Crenshaw v. Eudora Sch.
District, 360 Ark. 87, 199 S.W.3d 679 (2004) ("Crenshaw IF'); and Grayson v. Ross, No. 06-
946, 2006 WL 2627545 (Sept. 14, 2006).
12. See, e.g., Mays v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., United States District Court, Eastern
District of Arkansas, Western Division, Case No. 4-03-CIV-00209 (Doc. 147, p. 9) (the Ho-
norable Warren K. Urbom denied the plaintiff's motion for certification without prejudice as
being premature); Roberts-McNutt, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., United States District Court,
Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, Case No. 4-06-CIV-00125 (Doc. 35, pp. 10-
12) (the Honorable George Howard, Jr. denied the plaintiff's motion for certification of three
questions and finding that the Arkansas court decisions were not in conflict over the matters
sought to be certified by the plaintiff and also finding that at least one of the issues was irre-
levant to the actual proceedings before the federal court); Johnson v. City of Fort Smith,
United States District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Case No. 2:05-CIV-02136 (Doc.
185, p. 3) (the Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren denied the Defendants' motion for certifica-
tion of two questions stating that the questions sought to be certified "have been addressed by
previous federal courts," choosing to rely on prior federal court interpretation of Arkansas
state law rather than obtaining direction from the Arkansas Supreme Court itself).
13. ARK. R. SUp. CT. 6-8(a)(1).
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a. Which Arkansas state courts may answer
Section (a) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 permits only the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court to receive and respond to certified questions. " The
Arkansas General Assembly's rejection of an alternative rule, which would
have allowed the Arkansas Court of Appeals to respond to certified ques-
tions as well, sheds light on the reason why Section (a) may have been so
structured. In 1966, the American Law Institute suggested this same limita-
tion of allowing questions to be certified only to a state's highest court, 5 a
limitation that the UCQLA Commissioners later accepted.1 6 According to
one commentator, the reason for this decision was the thought by the
UCQLA Commissioners that delay "would be increased by certification to
an intermediate state court whose decisions would always be subject to ap-
peal and reversal."' 7 Therefore, certification to the Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals would defeat major purposes of the certification process of obtaining a
final, definitive answer on Arkansas state law and saving federal courts and
litigants time and money. By adopting the more limited approach, and the-
reby avoiding the risks of appeal and reversal, the Arkansas General As-
sembly helped to ensure that the certification process in Arkansas would
achieve these goals.
b. Discretionary power of the Arkansas Supreme Court to an-
swer
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(a) leaves the power to answer certi-
fied questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court's discretion. 8 The Arkansas
Supreme Court must decide whether to answer the certified question within
thirty days of the federal court's filing of the certification order.'9 If the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court takes no action within thirty days of the filing of the
certification order by a federal court, the Arkansas Supreme Court is
deemed to have declined to answer the question unless it has extended the
14. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(a).
15. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 140 (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVIsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 292, 294 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter ALI STUDY]; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
HANDBOOK 147 (1967)).
16. See id.; UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1, 12 UCQLA 52 (1967).
17. Robbins, supra note 5, at 140.
18. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a).
19. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a)(2). If the certification order is filed when the Arkansas Su-
preme Court is formally in recess, however, the thirty day time period will begin when the
Arkansas Supreme Court returns from the recess. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a)(4).
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time by order.20 Further, at its discretion, the Arkansas Supreme Court may,
at any time, rescind its decision to answer a certified question.2'
This discretion (1) allows the Arkansas Supreme Court to avoid ans-
wering too many certified questions and (2) gives it a mechanism that oper-
ates as a check on a certifying federal court to ensure that certified questions
meet the standards the Arkansas Supreme Court wants to require for certi-
fied questions. Thus, this discretion allows the Arkansas Supreme Court to
have control over its own docket, and simply by declining to answer such a
certified question, the Arkansas Supreme Court may decide to postpone
responding to a certified question that it is not ready to answer.
c. Arkansas Supreme Court standards for acceptance of certifi-
cation
The Arkansas Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to when
it will accept certification of a question of Arkansas law. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court has stated that it will accept a certified question only if (1) the
issues certified are truly contested by the parties and are presented on a fac-
tual record; (2) all facts material to the question of law to be determined are
undisputed; (3) an answer to the certified question will be dispositive of the
issue and res judicata between the parties; and (4) there are special and im-
portant reasons, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (a) the
question of law is one of first impression and is of such substantial public
importance as to require a prompt and definitive resolution by the Arkansas
Supreme Court; (b) there is no precedential guidance from Arkansas courts
of the question of law; (c) the question of law is one with respect to which
there are conflicting decisions in other courts; or (d) the question of law
concerns an unsettled issue of constitutionality or construction of an Arkan-
sas state statute.22 This list is not exhaustive, and other pertinent considera-
tions by the Arkansas Supreme Court may involve the interests of justice,
judicial economy, or any of the several considerations also conducted by the
federal courts.23
20. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a)(3).
21. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(a)(5).
22. See ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8; Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, 352 Ark. 207, 99
S.W.3d 427 (2003).
23. See, e.g., Shipley 11, 356 Ark. at 221, 148 S.W.3d at 746 ("After a review of the
certifying court's thorough analysis and 'explanation for the need for this court to answer the
questions of law presently pending in that court, we accept certification of the four [ ] ques-
tions ...."); Crenshaw II, 360 Ark. at 88, 199 S.W.3d at 679-80 ("After a review of the
certifying court's thorough analysis and explanation for the need for this court to answer the
questions of law presently pending in that court, we accept certification of the [ ] question.");
Grayson v. Ross, No. 06-946, 2006 WL 2627545, at *1 (Sept. 14, 2006) ("After a review of
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d. Which courts may certify questions to the Arkansas Supreme
Court
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(a) specifies which courts have the
power to certify questions of law to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Rule 6-
8(a) permits "a federal court of the United States" to certify questions to the
Arkansas Supreme Court.24 This language clearly allows all levels of the
federal court system including the United States Supreme Court, any court
of appeals of the United States, and any United States district court, to certi-
fy questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court.25
e. Time limit within which federal courts must certify questions
to the Arkansas Supreme Court
There does not appear to be any time limit on when federal courts must
certify questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The relatively few cases
that the Arkansas Supreme Court has certified have come from various dis-
trict courts of the United States federal judiciary, 26 as well as the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.27 There even appears to be authority from other juris-
dictions for granting certification after a federal court has decided a case.28
the certifying court's analysis and explanation of the need for this court to answer the re-
quested question of law, we accept certification of the []question.").
24. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a)(1).
25. Presumably the Arkansas General Assembly, as well as other states who have passed
certification rules and/or statutes with similar language, has engaged in the same debate as
the Uniform Law Commissioners on the important issue of allowing federal district courts to
certify questions. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 144. Those who are opposed to giving district
courts this power argue that by permitting only federal appellate courts to certify, no argu-
ment or delay over the statement of facts (as required under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-
8(c)(2)) would occur if the answering court simply used the record sent up on appeal. See id.
It is further argued that such a full factual record may also prevent criticism from being made
that answering courts are merely issuing advisory opinions. See id Those in favor of allow-
ing federal district courts to certify questions contend that "without such power, an appeal, in
effect, becomes mandatory to resolve the litigation properly, as any outcome attained without
certainty of the appropriate law remains sheer conjecture, and thus creates automatic grounds
for appeal." Id. at 145 (citing Transcript of 1966, supra note 5, at 19). Furthermore, it is ar-
gued that including district courts saves time and money by resolving cases as early as possi-
ble. See id.
26. See Longview, 352 Ark. at 207, 99 S.W.3d at 427; Shipley, 356 Ark. at 220, 148
S.W.3d at 746; and Crenshaw, 360 Ark. at 87, 199 S.W.3d at 679.
27. See Grayson, No. 06-946,2006 WL 2627545, at *1.
28. See 17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. 3d § 4248 (2006) (citing Fischer v. Bar Harbor
Banking & Trust, Co., 857 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989); Boyd
Rosene & Associates v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 178 F.3d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir. 1999)
("Never before has a party first requested certification after this court has issued an opinion.
With the exception of instances in the Fifth Circuit, this phenomenon has correspondingly not
occurred in other circuits."); Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co., 823 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.
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f. Types of questions certifiable and the standards for certifica-
tion by federal courts
Under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, the Arkansas Supreme
Court's power to answer questions certified by federal courts vests the fed-
eral courts with the inherent power to certify questions to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court. This inherent power of the federal courts is discretionary, and,
as noted by one commentator, the UCQLA Commissioners have not pro-
vided any guidance on tests or other guidelines for when a federal court
should certify a question to a state court such as the Arkansas Supreme
Court. 2 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, when it has
been required to interpret the State of Florida's certification statute or rule,
has provided much guidance to many other federal courts in identifying fac-
tors for deciding whether or not to certify a question of law to a state court.3°
Many federal courts have used factors identified by the Honorable Homer
Thornberry of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.3 In
Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp. ,32 Judge Thomberry set forth the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) the closeness of the question to settled law in the state;
(2) the existence of sufficient sources to allow a principled rather than con-
jectural decision; (3) the degree to which comity considerations are relevant,
as determined by state and public policy and the importance of the issue to
the state; (4) the delay and cost to the litigants; and (5) the ability of the cer-
tifying court to frame the issue in a manner that will produce a helpful re-
sponse on the part of the state court.33 Judge Thornberry suggested that the
certifying court use a balancing approach with these factors and consider the
significance of the question along with the benefits and costs of certifica-
tion.34 Also, in making their decision of whether or not to certify a question
to a state court, many federal courts cite a number of reasons that track the
elements required under the UCQLA.35
1987) ("Once a question is submitted for decision in the district court, the parties should be
bound by the outcome unless other grounds for reversal are present. Only in limited circums-
tances should certification be granted after a case has been decided.")).
29. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 145-46.
30. Id. at 146.
31. See id.
32. 526 F.2d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 930 (1976).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 274-76.
35. See generally Yonover, supra note 5, at 319.
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g. Types of questions certifiable
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(a) provides that a certifying court
may certify "questions of law ... if there are involved in any proceeding
before it questions of Arkansas law which may be determinative of the
cause then pending in the certifying court. 3 6 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme
Court will accept and answer only "questions of law" that federal courts
certify to it.
The broadest interpretation of the "may be determinative" language
suggests that certification to the Arkansas Supreme Court is appropriate in
virtually all circumstances, short of requiring superfluous effort by the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court.37 As no Arkansas Supreme Court decision has yet
addressed this issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court's answer to a certified
question may or may not be required to resolve the dispute before a certify-
ing court.
The generally accepted view in most jurisdictions is that the "may be
determinative" language means that an answer from a responding particular
state court will terminate the case in one lawsuit, whereas another answer
from the same responding state court will not terminate the case in another
lawsuit.38 One commentator notes, however, that this interpretation may
create concern in regard to states whose constitutions do not allow that
state's courts to render advisory opinions. 39 This interpretation also poses
the problem that the certification process may not become available until the
lawsuit has proceeded to the point that a certifying court is able to determine
whether or not certified questions would, in fact, terminate a particular
case.4° Despite the fact that this interpretation would negate some of the goal
of the certification process to resolve issues as quickly as possible in litiga-
tion, some commentators contend that such late-stage certification (1) al-
lows a state court to consider the certified question at a point in the litigation
where the issues surrounding the certified question are more fully developed
and (2) helps to make sure that resolving the state law question is a neces-
sary step in resolving the federal court case.4 1 This appears to be the ap-
proach taken by the Arkansas Supreme Court, and thus it seems that answers
to questions certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court must only be disposi-
tive of the issue presented and not dispositive of the entire federal case.42
36. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a)(1).
37. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 147.
38. See id. at 148.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 148.
42. See, Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, 352 Ark. 207, 209, 99 S.W.3d 427, 428
(2003).
UALR LAW REVIEW
In contrast, the interpretation of the "may be determinative" language
may be more limited. For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court strictly
interprets that phrase in such a way that it will not answer a certified ques-
tion unless its response will dispose of the entire federal lawsuit for which
the question has been certified to the court.43 As one commentator points
out, this strict interpretation may limit the usefulness of the certification
process by essentially making the certification process available only in
diversity cases.' This is because in federal question jurisdiction cases, a
federal court would be certifying a question of state law to avoid a federal
constitutional issue.45 In such a federal question jurisdiction case, one an-
swer would resolve the federal dispute in its entirety, whereas an alternative
answer would not terminate the federal case in its entirety but would instead
return the case for resolution of the federal constitutional issue. 46 Further, it
is argued that this strict interpretation is also paradoxical because it requires
the state law to be unclear while requiring the certifying court to judge
whether the answer will dispose of the case.47
h. The standard for certification
Another important element of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(a) is
the requirement that there be "no controlling precedent in the decisions of
the Supreme Court" for a question to be certified.48 The meaning of "con-
trolling precedent" has been debated among commentators and jurisdictions
that have adopted similar language.49 In their debates on the issue, some
UCQULA Commissioners argued that the word "controlling" might be con-
strued as binding a certifying court to follow previous, perhaps even out-
dated, decisions of the answering state, contending that the plain language of
a rule or statute that uses this language indicates that, if the state law at issue
in a case is clear, certification would be inappropriate. °
States that have similar language to that of Arkansas Supreme Court
Rule 6-8(a), however, generally recognize that the certification procedure is
an attempt to resolve ambiguities or unanswered questions concerning state
law, and thus certification is also proper when there is merely conflicting
43. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 147 (citing In re Certified Questions, 549 P.2d 1310,
1311 (Wyo. 1976)).
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(a)(1).
49. See generally Robbins, supra note 5, at 149-50.
50. See id. at 149 (citing Transcript of 1967, supra note 5, at 34).
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authority within a state.5 Therefore, the generally recognized approach,
assuming either a total lack of rulings or conflicting opinions, is that the
issue of law may be considered unresolved and certification may be consi-
dered appropriate.52 Some commentators and other jurisdictions further ar-
gue that, absent an opinion on point from the highest court of a state, a fed-
eral court's second step is to examine intermediate appellate court opinions
of that state, and after the examination of those appellate opinions, a federal
court must follow any applicable opinions before certifying a question to a
state court.53
It should be noted that some federal courts have gone beyond the two
steps discussed above "by deciding cases based upon secondary authorities
and recent trends in other jurisdictions., 54 The UCQLA is intended to en-
courage federal courts to certify the question rather than to rely on authority
that may be construed as arguably too attenuated, but it is recognized that
this decision should normally depend on other factors that a certifying court
may need to consider in light of the case before it.
55
i. Clarification needed from the Arkansas Supreme Court
With language as capable of manipulation as that contained in Arkan-
sas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(a), a certifying court, as well as the Arkansas
Supreme Court, can avoid or minimize the effectiveness of the certification
procedure. Because it is foreseeable that disputes might arise over whether
any particular law in question is clear or difficult to ascertain, a federal court
or the Arkansas Supreme Court has a convenient way of either avoiding or
employing certification. Nonetheless, commentators have suggested that
there is a need for the clarification of the certification standard in order for
certification to be a useful device when language similar to Arkansas Su-
preme Court Rule 6-8 is employed.
6
2. Method of Invoking
Section (b) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled "Method of
Invoking," sets forth the procedures for invoking Section (a).57 Section (b)
provides: "This rule may be invoked upon motion of a federal court of the
United States or upon motion of any party to the cause pending before the
51. See generally id.
52. See generally id. at 149-50.
53. See generally id.
54. See id. at 150.
55. See generally Robbins, supra note 5, at 150.
56. See, e.g., id. at 150.
57. ARK. R. Sup. CT. 6-8(b).
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court." 8 A plain reading of this provision seems to allow the certifying court
to issue a request for a certification order upon a motion from either the
court itself or any party in the case before it.
Some commentators, however, argue for, and other jurisdictions have
enacted, limitations on granting litigants requests for certification. 9 For ex-
ample, some argue that a litigant who invokes federal diversity jurisdiction
should be precluded from requesting certification due to what may be, de-
pending upon the circumstances of any particular case, the unfairness of
allowing a party to receive both a federal court determination of the facts
and a state court determination of the law in the same case.6° Some commen-
tators suggest further that a limitation also should be applied to defendants
who remove a case from state to federal court, as well as to a plaintiff who
chooses to initiate suit in federal court.61 However, other commentators note
that these positions do not take into account cases in which unanticipated
issues arise where the certification process would be the best way to proceed
but may be unavailable to a particular litigant because of the litigant's party
status in that particular case.62
3. Contents of Certification Order
If a federal court decides to submit a question to the Arkansas Supreme
Court, the federal court must prepare a "Motion to Certify a Question of
Law" and a "Certification Order," which the certifying judge signs and the
clerk for the applicable federal court forwards to the Clerk of the Arkansas
Supreme Court.63 Section (c) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled
"Contents of Certification Order," sets forth the specific details that must be
included in a certification order that a federal court issues.' The certification
order must contain: (a) the question of law to be answered; 65 (b) the facts
relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the controversy out of
which the question arose; 66 (c) a statement acknowledging that the Arkansas
Supreme Court, acting as the receiving court, may reformulate the ques-
tion;67 and (d) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties ap-
pearing without counsel.68
58. ARK. R. Sup. CT. 6-8(b).
59. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 151 (citing Transcript of 1967, supra note 5, at 46).
60. See generally id (citations omitted).
61. See generally id.
62. Id. atn.193.
63. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(d).
64. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c).
65. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(A).
66. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(B).
67. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(C).
68. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(D).
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a. The question of law to be answered
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(c)(1)(A) directs that a certification
order set forth the question or questions of law that the Arkansas Supreme
Court is to answer.69 Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(c)(1)(A) does not
specify who is required to frame the certified questions. Thus, at least in-
itially, it seems that either the parties or the certifying court may frame the
certified question to the Arkansas Supreme Court.70 Presumably, the parties
will agree to a question subject to court approval with or without modifica-
tion. If the parties are unable to agree, then the only other entity available to
formulate the questions is the certifying court, which must then frame such
questions.
b. The facts relevant to the question
The certification order should also present a statement of the relevant
facts. 7' The statement of facts must be sufficient to show fully the nature of
the controversy out of which the question arose.72 According to the com-
mentary of the UCQLA Commissioners, "[t]his provision attempts to avoid
violations of some state constitutions, which prohibit their courts from ans-
wering abstract questions, by showing the presence of an actual controversy
to be resolved. 73
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 does not specify, or otherwise limit,
who is to prepare the statement of facts. Thus, a plain reading of Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 6-8 indicates that it is likely proper for a federal court
to require the parties to compose a joint statement of facts to be sent to the
Arkansas Supreme Court. If the litigants cannot agree upon a statement of
the facts, however, the certifying court must determine the relevant facts and
state them as part of its certification order.74 In contrast, however, if a court
of appeals of the United States certifies the question, the statement of facts
should consist of the trial court's finding of facts.75
69. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(A).
70. In at least two other states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, cases indicate that the
certifying court alone may frame the questions. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 152 (citing
Murray v. Norberg, 423 F. Supp. 795 (D. R.I. 1976); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 384 F.
Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1974)).
71. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(B).
72. Id.
73. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 153 (citing Transcript of 1967, supra note 5, at 32).
74. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(c)(2).
75. See id.; see also Grayson H, No. 06-946, 2006 WL 2627545, at *1 (Sept. 14, 2006).
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c. Power to reformulate the certified question
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(c)(1)(C) specifies that the Arkansas
Supreme Court retains the power to alter and reformulate the language of
the certified question.76 Commentators suggest that the ability of a state
court, such as the Arkansas Supreme Court, to reformulate or add to the
issues of questions that are certified to it furthers the goals of the certifica-
tion process.77 As stated by one commentator, "[b]y definition, the receiving
court is best situated to frame the question for precedential value and to con-
trol the development of its internal laws."78
4. Finalizing and Submission of the Certification Order
Section (d) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled "Preparation
of Certification Order," sets forth the procedure to be followed once the
parties have agreed to or the court has prepared the contents of the certifica-
tion order.79 The certifying court is to finalize the certification order, and the
judge presiding at the hearing is to sign it.8° The clerk of the certifying court
then forwards the order to the clerk of the Arkansas Supreme Court under
the certifying court's official seal.8
The Arkansas Supreme Court may request other portions of the record
if it finds them necessary to properly dispose of the certified question." The
Arkansas Supreme Court may in fact require the certifying court to file the
original or copies of all or any portion of the record before it.83
5. Costs of Certification
Section (e) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled "Costs of
Certification," dictates that fees and costs of certification are the same as in
any other civil appeal docketed before the Arkansas Supreme Court. 84 The
rule further specifies that the fees and costs of certification to the Arkansas
Supreme Court are to be equally divided between the litigants unless the
certifying court orders otherwise in its certification order.8 5 The fee for civil
appeals to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and thus the cost of certifying ques-
76. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(c)(1)(C).
77. Robbins, supra note 5, at 153.
78. Id.
79. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(d).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(e).
85. Id.
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tions to the Arkansas Supreme Court, was increased by the Arkansas Gener-
al Assembly in its most recent session from $100 to $1506 plus costs.8 7
6. Briefs and Opinions
Section (f) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled "Briefs and
Argument," provides the Arkansas Supreme Court rules governing the briefs
filed and arguments heard before the Arkansas Supreme Court. 88 One poten-
tial problem is that an attorney may find himself or herself with a request for
argument in the State of Arkansas when he or she is not a member of the
Arkansas Bar. Whether the Arkansas Supreme Court would allow such an
attorney to appear in the case rests within the discretion of the Arkansas
Supreme Court. 9 The attorney may remedy this problem, however, by either
petitioning to argue the case pro hac vice or by employing local counsel.9"
7. The Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion
Section (g) of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, entitled "Opinion,"
states that the Arkansas Supreme Court must write an opinion stating the
law governing the question certified to it and that the Arkansas Supreme
Court clerk must send copies of the opinion to the certifying court and to the
litigants.9' The Arkansas Supreme Court is among the majority of state
courts that treat these opinions as formal and report them in their state re-
porters just like ordinarily decided cases.92 Thus, an answer by the Arkansas
Supreme Court to a certified question becomes binding precedent93 and
86. See H.R. 1715, 86th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2007) (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 21-6-401(a)(1) (Supp. 2007)).
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-401(c) (Supp. 2007).
88. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(e).
89. See ARK. R. ADMIS. BAR XIV; McKenzie v. State, 358 Ark. 344, 189 S.W.3d 441
(2004); Preston v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sci., 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003); Willett
v. State, 334 Ark. 40, 970 S.W.2d 804 (1998); Undem v. State Bd. of Law Exmrs., 266 Ark.
683, 587 S.W.2d 563 (1979); McGehee v. State, 182 Ark. 603, 32 S.W.2d 308 (1930).
90. See McKenzie, 358 Ark. at 346-47, 189 S.W.3d at 443.
91. ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8(g).
92. See Shipley, Inc. v. Long, 359 Ark. 208, 208, 195 S.W.3d 911, 911 (2004) ("Shipley
IV'); Crenshaw v. Eudora Sch. Dist., 362 Ark. 288, 288, 208 S.W.3d. 206, 206 (2005)
("Crenshaw l/'); Grayson v. Ross, No. 06-946, 2007 WL 766333 (Ark. Mar. 15, 2007). In
the case of Longview, the parties settled the dispute, and the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana withdrew the certified question, asking the Arkansas Su-
preme Court for voluntary dismissal of the matter before the Arkansas Supreme Court issued
an answer to the certified question. See Docket Report, Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, No.
03-156 (Ark. 2003).
93. See generally Robbins, supra note 5, at 155 (citing Transcript of 1966, supra note 5,
at 7).
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"serves as res judicata regarding the parties, thus ensuring more equitable
judicial decisions and distinguishing the response to certified questions from
an advisory opinion."94
III. ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS POWER TO
CERTIFY
Although a thorough discussion of the power of the Arkansas Supreme
Court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals for interstate certification is
beyond the scope of this article, 95 it will be noted that the final provision (h)
under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 provides for interstate certification
by the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals.96 This
provision empowers the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of
Appeals to certify a question of law to the highest court of another state if it
appears that the question of law may be determinative of the cause pending
and that there are no controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest
court of the receiving state.97
Furthermore, the Arkansas General Assembly provided that the proce-
dures used for certification from the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals to another state are to be those procedures provided
in the laws of the receiving state. 98 As of the date of the writing of this ar-
ticle, however, there has been no guidance from the Arkansas Supreme
Court nor the Arkansas General Assembly on the issue of what will occur if
the procedures set forth in Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8(h) are in con-
flict with the procedures for certification provided in the laws of the receiv-
ing state.
IV. LENGTH OF DELAY CAUSED BY THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
The certification process is not a quick process, but it is much less time
consuming than the alternative of abstention by a federal court. Nonetheless,
the additional time that the certification process may entail is a concern to
both litigants and courts contemplating whether or not to certify a question
to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
94. See generally id. (citations omitted).
95. As noted above, though the scope of this Article is limited to the question of inter-
jurisdictional certification from federal courts to the Arkansas Supreme Court, similar issues
are present when a state court must apply the law of a foreign state. For a discussion of certi-
fication in this context, see generally id.
96. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(h).
97. Jd.
98. Id.
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As discussed above, the Arkansas Supreme Court treats certification as
an appeal.99 Thus, delay is inherent in the process. The process of certifica-
tion requires appellate brief writing, an amicus curiae brief from the Arkan-
sas Attorney General, and, possibly, abstracting and oral arguments."
There are numerous estimates as to the length of delay that the certifi-
cation process causes.'0 ° One federal judicial study reported that the time
required for a state court to answer a certified question is approximately six
to seven months. 10 2 Other commentators concluded in their estimates that the
certification process generally causes delays of longer than one year'0 3 with
an average being about fifteen months.3 4 These time estimates are in addi-
tion to the time spent by the federal court in deciding whether a case should
be certified, which itself may generate the need for additional briefings and
court appearances if the parties object.'0 5 As demonstrated in the following
discussion, Arkansas is on par with the lower estimates of time delay dis-
cussed above.
In Longview Production Co. v. Dubberly, as indicated above, the par-
ties settled the dispute, and the Honorable Thomas Eaton Stagg, Jr., Senior
United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, withdrew
the certified question and asked the Arkansas Supreme Court for voluntary
dismissal of the matter before the Arkansas Supreme Court issued an answer
to the certified question. 10 6 Thus, it is unclear how long the actual process
would have taken for the certifying court and the Arkansas Supreme Court
to complete the Arkansas Supreme Court's first encounter with the certifica-
tion process. The certified question in Longview, however, was not ans-
wered within the approximately nine months it took between the certifying
court's Certification Order of February 11, 2003, and the Arkansas Supreme
Court's order approving dismissal on November 17, 2003.
In Shipley, Inc. v. Long, acting sue sponte and upon his own motion
and "Memorandum Opinion and Certification Order" of February 4, 2004,
the Honorable Garnett Thomas Eisele, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, moved for the Arkansas Supreme Court to
answer four questions of law. 10 7 On February 19, 2004, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court issued its per curiam acceptance of the certification of the four
99. See ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8.
100. See id.; Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, 352 Ark. 207, 211-12, 99 S.W.3d 427,
429-30 (2003).
101. See generally Yonover, supra note 5, at 332-34.
102. See generally id. at 333-34 (citing SERON, supra note 5, at 15, 39).
103. See id. (citing Mattis, supra note 5, at 726).
104. See id. (citing Shapiro, supra note 5, at 326-27).
105. See generally id.
106. See Docket Report, Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, No. 03-156 (Ark. 2003).
107. Shipley I, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 820; Shipley, 4:03-C1V-00481 (Doc. 32).
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questions. °8 The Arkansas Supreme Court acceptance was filed in the Unit-
ed States District Court on February 26, 2004.'09 On October 21, 2004, the
Arkansas Supreme Court issued its opinion answering the four certified
questions."0 The Arkansas Supreme Court opinion answering the four certi-
fied questions was filed in the United States District Court on November 12,
2004."' On November 16, 2004, the United States District Court filed its
Memorandum Opinion and Final Order" 2 and Declaratory Judgment"3 in
the Shipley case. Thus, the certification process in the Shipley case took a
little longer than nine months.
In Crenshaw v. Eudora School District,"l4 the Honorable James Leon
Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
acting sue sponte, issued an order proposing to certify a question to the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court on October 22, 2004.'" 5 On November 8, 2004, the
plaintiffs filed their response to the court's request for comment on certifica-
tion."16 On November 9, 2004, the defendant filed its response to the court's
request for comment on certification. "' On November 29, 2004, the United
States District Court issued its Certification Order and moved the Arkansas
Supreme Court to answer one certified question."8 On December 9, 2004,
the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its per curiam order accepting the certi-
fied question.'l 9 The per curiam order was filed with the district court on
December 13, 2004.12° On May 12, 2005, the Arkansas Supreme Court is-
sued its opinion in response to the certified question.' 2 ' The Arkansas Su-
preme Court's answer was filed with the district court on June 6, 2005.122 On
July 18, 2006, the district court issued an Order of Dismissal after the parties
advised the court that they had reached a settlement in the matter. 123 Despite
when the case actually ended, the certification process in Crenshaw took
just a few days short of a full nine months.
108. Shipley I1, 356 Ark. at 221.
109. Shipley Il, No. 4:03-CIV-00481 (Doc. 33).
110. Shipley IV, 359 Ark. at 208.
111. Shipley 111, No. 4:03-CIV-00481 (Doc. 34).
112. Shipley III, No. 4:03-CIV-00481 (Doc. 35).
113. Shipley III, No. 4:03-CIV-00481 (Doc. 36).
114. No. 5:03-CIV-00330 ("Crenshaw "').
115. Crenshawl, No. 5:03-CIV-00330 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2004) (Doc. 16).
116. Crenshawl, No. 5:03-CIV-00330 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 8, 2004) (Doc. 18).
117. Crenshawl, No. 5:03-C1V-00330 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2004) (Doc. 19).
118. Certification Order, Crenshaw I, No. 5:03-CIV-00330 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 29, 2004)
(Doc. 20).
119. Crenshaw I, No. 5:03-CIV-00330 (Doc. 22).
120. See id.
121. Crenshaw I, No. 5:03-CIV-00330 (Doc. 23).
122. See id
123. Crenshaw I, No. 5:03-CIV-00330 (Doc. 43).
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In Grayson v. Ross,'24 the Honorable Morris Sheppard Arnold, the Ho-
norable Clarence Arlen Beam, and the Honorable William Jay Riley, for the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, acting sue sponte, issued a Certification
Order directing the Clerk for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to certify a
question to the Arkansas Supreme Court on July 19, 2006, and moved for
the Arkansas Supreme Court to answer one certified question.'25 On August
23, 2006, the Eighth Circuit Clerk's Office filed a Judge Order requesting
that the clerk certify the question of law to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 26
On August 25, 2006, the Arkansas Supreme Court received and docketed
the Certification Order from the Eighth Circuit.'27 On September 14, 2006,
the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its per curiam order accepting the certi-
fied question. 28 The per curiam order was filed with the Eighth Circuit on
September 18, 2006.129 On March 15, 2007, the Arkansas Supreme Court
issued its answer to the certified question. 30 The Arkansas Supreme Court's
answer was filed with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 5,
2007. "' The Eighth Circuit court panel thereafter stated that the answer by
the Arkansas Supreme Court resolved their uncertainty and, applying Ar-
kansas law in accord with the answer from the Arkansas Supreme Court,
issued its opinion and disposed of the case on April 26, 2007. 32 Thus, the
certification process in Grayson took approximately two weeks short of a
full nine months.
V. CONCLUSION
The certification process allowed under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule
6-8 is neither simple nor inexpensive, but it will most likely be less compli-
cated and expensive than other alternatives available to a federal court and
litigants involved in federal court litigation when a question of unclear Ar-
kansas state law presents itself. Certification is treated as an appeal.
3 1
Therefore, fees and costs are the same as in any other civil appeal docketed
124. 454 F.3d 802, 812 (8th Cir. 2006), certified question accepted Grayson v. Ross, No.
06-946, 2006 WL 2627545 (Ark. Sept. 14, 2006), certified question answered Grayson v.
Ross, No. 06-946, 2006 WL 766333 (Ark. Mar. 15, 2007), answer to certified question ap-
plied Grayson v. Ross, 483 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2007).
125. Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 812 (8th Cir. 2006).
126. Id., Judge Order filed August 23, 2006 (Doc. 2081706).
127. Docket Report, Grayson v. Ross, No. 06-946 (Ark. 2006).
128. Grayson v. Ross, No. 06-946, 2006 WL 2627545 (Ark. Sept. 14, 2006).
129. Certification Order, Grayson v. Ross, No. 04-CIV-3577 (8th Cir. 2006).
130. Grayson v. Ross, No. 06-946, 2007 WL 766333 (Ark. Mar. 15, 2007).
131. Grayson v. Ross, No. 04-CIV-3577 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007).
132. Grayson v. Ross, 483 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2007).
133. See ARK. R. SUP. CT. 6-8; Longview, 352 Ark. 207, 211-12, 99 S.W.3d 427, 430
(2003).
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before the Arkansas Supreme Court and are equally divided between the
parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its certification
order.'34 Furthermore, certification requires appellate brief writing, an ami-
cus curiae brief from the Arkansas Attorney General, and, possibly, ab-
stracting and oral arguments. 1
35
It is easy to understand how the law can be slow to change, especially
as to the procedural mechanisms by which courts manage the litigation
process. However, the certification process that is now allowed under Ar-
kansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 (1) provides a practical and efficient method
by which federal courts can discern the state laws of Arkansas when they are
faced with an unclear question of Arkansas state law and (2) allows the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court the opportunity to decide important and significant
matters of Arkansas state law.
As discussed above, the certification process has enjoyed much praise,
and its use has been highly encouraged. "The United States Supreme Court.
. [has] praised widespread, liberal use of certification as a [sign] of respect
for state court comity" and the duty of state courts to determine their own
state law. 3 6 Nevertheless, like any other process, the certification process
presents the possibility for abuse and requires vigilant and careful analysis
by both federal courts seeking to certify questions and the Arkansas Su-
preme Court in deciding whether or not to accept such questions. Therefore,
the use of the certification procedure should be neither encouraged nor dis-
couraged, but rather should be considered carefully and granted only when
the process serves the jurisprudence for the State of Arkansas, the certifying
federal court, the litigants, and the overall judicial process.
In any event, the use of the certification process to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court will, undoubtedly, only increase as the Arkansas Supreme
Court and federal courts that encounter questions of Arkansas state law be-
come more familiar with the procedure. Therefore, it is important for Arkan-
sas practitioners to realize that this procedure is available and educate them-
selves about the process, as they may find themselves in a position to exer-
cise the benefits of certification if any of their cases so warrant.
134. ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8(e).
135. See ARK. R. SuP. CT. 6-8; Longview, 352 Ark. at 211-12, 99 S.W.3d at 430.
136. See Cochran, supra note 5, at 220-21.
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